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Publications: Judiciary
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By Linn Hammergren Democracy Fellow - USAID Global Center for Democracy and Governance [ * ] March 2002
Introduction: The experience and the accumulated knowledge have hardly diminished the interest in or the debates over reform. The amount of national and international funding devoted to the sector continues to grow while the number and types of problems addressed expands as well. Some observers have in fact suggested we are reaching a point of diminishing returns -- too many funds chasing too many objectives with a resulting reform agenda that no set of national institutions could possibly realize [ 2 ]. Although the current situation does not encourage it, we have arguably reached a stage where a certain amount of reflection and reordering of priorities is desirable. Fifteen years may have been excessive for what was accomplished, but experience does demonstrate that reform is inherently slow, complicated, and conflictual. Whatever consensus initially informs it will hardly be sufficient to guide the multitude of issues and choices it inevitably raises or to incorporate the many new actors demanding a stake in the proceedings. Such apparently simple concepts as judicial independence have in practice proved much less straight forward and introduced far more fundamental debates about the role of the various branches of government, their individual and collective accountability to their citizens, and the values their actions should uphold. The initial agreement on the need to eliminate judicial poverty has now raised issues about how much societies should spend on justice, and who should pay the bill. Demands for more resources have also led to questions about the returns on these investments and how they should be measured. It has been suggested that the frequent complaints about the lack of progress in reform may be based on unrealistic expectations as to what could be accomplished -- better courts will not eliminate crime or societal conflict, nor can they more than marginally affect gross social inequities. Clearly Latin American societies were not served well by their court systems nor did they serve the latter adequately. However, a marked improvement on both counts is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for addressing more basic social ills. Still, even accepting these limitations on what reform can do, and acknowledging the unresolved issues as to what it should do, there is considerable room for improvement in the design and implementation of the current and next generation of reforms. It will, as is argued below, require better use of the knowledge we have acquired, a more adequate definition of and agreement on objectives and strategies, and a greatly enhanced coordination among those attempting to further them. The rest of this paper aims at some specific recommendations, first reviewing the underlying problems, then discussing the evolution of approaches to define and resolve them, and finally turning to areas where more attention is needed. The principal focus is the judiciary, as the central actor in the justice system, and the one whose reform has proved most difficult to define. Many of the lessons and recommendations, however, are more widely applicable, encompassing the entire gamut of organizations and institutions included in any justice (as opposed to judicial) reform program. ______________________________* The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of USAID or World Learning, the managing entity for the Democracy Fellowship Program. [1] I am using this term to signify a variety of public and private sector entities and the formal and informal rules governing their conduct. At a minimum this would include the courts, public prosecution and defense, police, prisons, the private bar, law schools, and various civil society groups. Any traditional or alternative dispute resolution systems could also be incorporated. Specific reforms usually target only a portion of the entire set, and some (but generally not in Latin America) have expanded their scope to encompass regulatory agencies, legislatures (in their law drafting role), a wider variety of substantive legislation, and affected groups in the private sector. [2] This has been most marked in post-conflict countries like Guatemala where by one observer’s count, foreign donors are currently competing to invest almost $200 million in a justice sector which will have enormous difficulty absorbing it usefully. |