The study presented under this theme dealt with the legislative functions of Arab parliaments in each of Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen. Each case was dealt with separately.

This section sheds the light on the legislative performance of the Egyptian People's Council or parliament between 1990 and 2000. It begins by surveying the role of government and parliament in the legislative process. It then surveys parliament's legislative activity during the current or seventh legislative cycle.

Article 86 of the Egyptian constitution specifies two basic functions for the People's Council or parliament: Legislation and monitoring. However, the legislative role failed to remain a monopoly of parliament as the role of the executive power in legislation grew gradually in the issuance of bills of all kinds and the proposal of laws.

The role of parliament figures prominently in the passing of laws as they move through the various stages of the legislative process: Proposition, preparation, formulation, study and ratification of laws. The proposition of laws is a fixed right of parliament as stipulated in article 109 of the 1971 constitution's: "The president of the republic and each member of the People's Council have the right to propose laws."

However, the President role in this respect is distinct from that of MPs. The bills proposed by the president are called "draft laws" while those presented by MPs are called "law proposals". Moreover, bills proposed by the executive power have priority over those presented by MPs.

Furthermore, bills proposed by the executive power are directly referred to a parliamentary committee to examine them and give a report about them while a "law proposal "presented by an MP, before it is referred to a specialized committee, is sent first to a special committee -the proposal and complaints committee- that would decide its suitability to be reviewed by parliament.

While the draft laws that are rejected by parliament may be re-introduced in the same legislative period, the law proposals cannot be presented again during the same legislative period.

After referring a draft law or a law proposal to the committees, it is then debated in a meeting of parliament to be attended by a majority of MPs in order to be legally valid.

The president of the republic has the right to accept or reject a bill. However, should the president fail to act within 30 days, the bill becomes law and is issued as such.

The president's legislative role becomes evident through his right to take decisions that have the force of law when parliament is not in session, and in case developments, that cannot be delayed, require swift measures. However, parliament should review these decisions fifteen days after their issuance if parliament is in session or in its first meeting in case of its dissolution or cessation of its meetings. If these decisions are not presented to parliament before the deadline or if they are presented to parliament and rejected by it, they lose their power as laws.

The president of the republic enjoys the prerogative of ratifying treaties with the stipulation that parliament must approve peace, alliance, commercial and navigation treaties and all treaties that entail modification of national territory or those related to sovereignty rights or those that entail financial burdens on the national treasury as stipulated in the budget.

Then the study surveys the legislative activity of the Egyptian People's Council (parliament) during the two-legislative periods 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. It attempts to underscore these activities through a survey of the draft laws, law proposals, decrees, treaties and agreements that parliament has reviewed.

The legislative activity of the Egyptian parliament during the sixth round from 1990-1995 was characterized by special features that began with the initiation of economic reform in Egypt on the one hand and coincided with the Gulf War and Madrid Conference on the other.

As for the draft laws considered by the People's Council, the Council debated and approved during the sixth legislative cycle 921 draft laws of which 192 were diverse laws and 729 were financial and closing account laws. In other words, the economic domain occupied the largest part of these laws.

It is to be noted that during the five rounds of meetings in the sixth legislative cycle, the draft laws included several proposals that concentrated on the necessity of taking into consideration the social dimension and to avoid the side effects of the economic reform policies. On the other hand, the number of law proposals was 101 proposals.

Parliament debated 49 of them and they mostly dealt with the issues related to syndicates, unions, tax exemption, state workers, land reclamation and consumer protection. Parliament also debated 13 decisions which dealt with the armed forces, organizing political rights, amending the regulations of the judicial power and bank secrecy. Moreover, parliament, in its sixth legislative cycle, reviewed 394 agreements.

During the seventh legislative cycle, parliament debated, in the first round of its meetings, 52 diverse draft laws, 178 financial and final budgetary accounting draft laws and 27 law proposals as well as approving one presidential decision and discussing 41 agreements.

During the first round of meetings of this cycle, draft laws concerned with economic reform, especially those that encourage investments in accordance with the liberalization policies which the Egyptian government is following, dominated parliament's deliberations. In contrast, parliament debated four law proposals only.

In the second round of meetings in this cy, parliament debated 38 diverse draft laws, 125 draft laws of a financial and final budgetary accounting nature and 12 law proposals as well as approving three presidential decisions and discussing 36 agreements. The law proposals reflected in the second round, a great interest on the part of the MPs in addressing the legislative vacuum that could accrue due to the unconstitutionality of certain articles of some laws. Also, in this round, parliament reviewed 36 agreements and treaties.

In the third round of meetings in this cycle, parliament debated 54 draft laws, in addition to draft laws of financial and final budgetary accounting nature, 40 law proposals, 39 agreements and four presidential decisions. Furthermore, parliament debated in this round 39 agreements of economic nature for the sake of encouraging investments.

In the fourth round of meetings, parliament reviewed 31 diverse draft laws and 128 draft laws concerned with financial and final accounting matters. In these latter laws the economic side predominated. First among them, are the trade draft law, the draft law to increase Egypt's share in the IMF, the draft law for the amendment of some stipulations of the customs law, the draft laws concerned with confronting the side effects of the economic reform policies and the NGOs draft law.

Also in the fourth round, parliament reviewed 45 law proposals. The most important among them were the law proposals concerned with the tax-value-added (TVA) law and the law for organizing the transfer of human organs and transplants. Furthermore, parliament debated four decrees and 97 agreements concerned mostly with terrorism, voluntary organizations, the development of financial markets and the social fund for development.

The parliamentary fifth round of meetings of the seventh legislative cycle, which ended in June 2000, debated until the preparation of this study, 14 draft laws. The most important laws that parliament approved were the draft law concerned with establishing some litigation procedures in personal status matters and the draft law concerned with organizing political rights.

The economic and financial matters, especially those concerned with economic reform, market liberalization policies and encouraging investments, dominated the draft laws presented to the Egyptian People's Councils (parliament) in the different rounds of the seventh legislative cycle.

In assessing the legislative experiment of the Egyptian People's Council (parliament), the study made many remarks. Most prominent among them are:
1. The imbalance between the executive and legislative powers which is due to the powers which the constitution has granted to the president of the republic. These powers entitled the president to propose draft laws that do not follow the same procedures that laws proposals proposed by MPs follow. Furthermore, the constitution allows the president of the republic to object to the laws which parliament issues, and gives him the right to propose amendments of the constitution and take decisions that have the power of law. This imbalance is exacerbated by the balance of political power within parliament itself as the ruling National Party dominates the majority of the People's Council seats.
2. The absolute prevalence of draft laws presented by the government over law proposals presented by the MPs. 3. The weakness of the legislative initiative of the MPs when exercising their right in proposing laws.
4. The speed with which parliament issues laws despite the importance of some laws that require taking time in examining them before they are approved.
5. The undertaking by parliament of an extremely important role in establishing the legislative order that paves and accompanies the economic reform process.
6. Parliament's extravagance in introducing the way for amendments to existing laws which led to "legislative inflation or explosion" and caused much inconvenience to those involved in legal matters in Egypt.
7. Parliament's approval of a number of extremely unpopular laws such as the unified professional syndicate's law, law no.93 concerned with the press and the agricultural rental law no. 96.
8. The necessity to activate the legislative role of parliamentary committees.

The study pointed out that the Lebanese parliament performed the role of safety valve for the civil government in Lebanon since independence in 1943. Despite the civil war and the Israeli occupation for parts of its territory, the military did not assume exclusive power as happened in a number of Third World countries.

The Lebanese constitution adopted the system of separation of powers since its issuance in 1926 and it entrusted the legislative power to parliament. Article 16 of the constitution states that "the legislative power is vested in one body, the Council of Deputies (parliament)." Article 24 of the amended Lebanese constitution pursuant to the Taef Accord states that parliament consists of "elected deputies whose number and manner of election is carried out in accordance with the election laws in force...". The Taef Accord, which represented a project for the resolution of the Lebanese crisis and the termination of the civil war in Lebanon, introduced amendments to the constitution which extended the prerogatives of parliament. Consequently, the political system became more of a parliamentarian system and not semi-presidential anymore as parliament started exercising an important role in the choice of prime minister.

Furthermore, the procedure for examining urgent draft laws has also been amended thus allowing parliament more time to consider these laws. These amendments also increased the effective role of the speaker whose term became four years, co-extensive with the term of the legislature.

The Taef Accord preserved the sectarian arrangement for the election of deputies or MPs as it is and divided the number of parliamentary seats equally between Muslims and Christians until parliament introduces a non-sectarian electoral law. The Taef Accord promoted an electoral law that distributes constituencies on the basis of muhafaza (administrative province-Lebanon is divided into 6 muhafazas), but the electoral law of 1999 redivided Lebanon into 14 electoral constituencies. The new electoral law raised a broad wave of criticism among the Lebanese.

The legislative prerogatives of the Lebanese parliament do not differ from those exercised in general by other parliaments in other countries of the world. These prerogatives are legislation, the national budget and monitoring. However, the Lebanese parliament enjoys a special legislative feature concerned with constitutional amendments. Article 77 of the constitution grants parliament the right to request the revision of the constitution. This measure could be accomplished in a regular session and upon the suggestion of at least 10 MPs who would need the consent of one third of parliament's member in order to debate the proposal.

The legislative process in the Lebanese parliament passes through several stages. Laws are first proposed either as draft laws presented by government or law proposals presented by MPs. A law proposal must carry the signatures of 10 deputies. Following that, the law proposals and draft laws are debated and then voted on. The speaker refers the draft laws and the law proposals to the specialized committees to study them. After debating them, they are voted on by the raising of hands and laws that get an absolute majority of the votes of MPs, who constitute a quorum, are approved.

In the case of the retraction of draft laws and laws proposals, article 103 of the parliament's by-laws stipulates that it is not permitted to retract draft laws presented by a presidential decree before the final voting unless it is retracted by another presidential decree. However, law proposals presented by MPs may be retracted when the member presenting the law proposal addresses a written request to that effect to the speaker. The study conducts a general evaluation of the legislative performance for the Lebanese parliament during the two cycles from 1992-1996 and 1996-2000.

During the first cycle, the study asserts that the parliament's performance fluctuated between strengand weakness vis-à-vis the government as a consequence of the parliament's weak representation of the Lebanese people and because most deputies lacked independent decision-making. However, parliament registered several important positions and performed an important role in political life at a time when Lebanon had just emerged from war. It also sought to preserve its independence the executive power when it refused all requests of the then prime minister, Rafik Hariri, to be granted the authority to issue laws by decree. This parliament distinguished itself further in the domain of legislative practice in contrast to previous Lebanese parliaments. Out of 53 sessions held, 34 sessions were devoted to the exercise of the legislative role.

Furthermore, it approved 426 laws which needed 316 hours of deliberations. Moreover, the parliament approved 68 law proposals which represented 16% of the total number of laws approved by it. This number of laws represents a ratio that exceeds the prevalent average in most countries of the world in respect to the ratio of law proposals presented by MPs to the total number of laws approved by parliament. This demonstrates the extent of the legislative performance of the Lebanese parliament for the period 1992 - 1996 whether we consider the quantity or quality of legislations. Thus, these legislations included basic issues related to the media, social security, housing, banking, the penal code, human and women's rights and the constitutional council. In addition, the parliament took a firm stand in the face of the government's repeated attempts to weaken the freedom of expression.

The study mentioned several observations on the parliament's performance for the years 1992 - 1996 made by a number of researchers and analysts. Among these observations: the decrease of the ratio of law proposals presented by MPs to the total number of laws on its agenda, the ratification of all proposed laws originating from the government without thorough deliberation for some of them and the haste in ratifying others. For example, 17 draft laws were approved in half an hour in a session on May 21, 1996 despite the loss of the quorum for holding the session.

The 1996 - 2000 parliament, the study observed, witnessed the fall of the ratio of deputies belonging to political parties: 32 deputies constituting 25% of the total members of parliament in contrast to 83 deputies in the 1992 parliament (64 % of total membership).

The study also noted that there has been an increase in the ratio of those who enjoy high educational qualifications among the MPs and pointed out that some of the present MPs are former ministers who enjoy distinctive experience and inner knowledge of government work which would strengthen the parliament's position vis - à - vis the government.

During the first two years of the parliament's term from 1996 - 1997, it held 19 general sessions, ten of which were confined to legislation and the remaining sessions were devoted to the exercise of monitoring and financial duties. This fact shows the importance that the parliament attaches to its legislative function.

During the sessions devoted to legislation, the parliament approved draft laws and law proposals out of which were 58 ordinary draft laws and 10 urgent draft laws, 13 ordinary law proposals and 15 urgent law proposals representing 29% of the total number of laws, a ratio that exceeds the world's average.

The most prominent laws that parliament approved in 1999 were the law for the protection of intellectual, literary and artistic property and the law on telephone tapping.

The Kuwaiti legislative experience represents a system that is a mixture of two models: the traditional hereditary model and the constitutional parliamentary model. In addition, women are deprived, in addition to some other social segments, of their rights to participate in the political process.

The Kuwaiti political experiment favors the executive power over the legislative power. The Emir of Kuwait shares with Majlis Al-Ummah (parliament) in the legislative process in accordance with article 51 of the constitution and also in accordance with article 106 which grants the Emir the right to postpone by decree the meeting of the Majlis once for a period that does not exceed one month during the legislative period. Furthermore, the Kuwaiti constitution does not give parliament the right to grant the government a vote of confidence upon its formation after the elections nor the right to withdraw confidence from the government when it fails to carry out its duties properly. The constitution makes the emir the arbiter to whom the prime minister resorts to complain of the lack of cooperation between the executive and legislative powers.

Often enough, the Kuwaiti political process witnessed the devise of the elected legislative power. Moreover, the amalgamation of the positions of crown prince and prime minister caused several political and legislative crises.

The Kuwaiti political system follows the one chamber principle for the legislative power. The Kuwaiti parliament consists of 50 members elected by direct secret ballot. Article 16 of the constitution stipulates that the number of ministers should not exceed one third of the number of the members of Majlis Al-Ummah, that is 16 ministers, including the prime minister.

The by-laws of the Kuwaiti Majlis assign three functions to itself: legislative affairs, financial affairs and political affairs. Concerning legislation, parliament shares with the emir the right of proposing laws in accordance with article 65 of the constitution which stipulates that the emir enjoys the right of proposing, approving and issuing laws. On the other hand, article 109 gave an MP the right of proposing laws without however being able to re-propose a rejected law during the same legislative period.

The draft laws presented to the Majlis ought to be brief and accompanied by a statement justifying their proposal, The legislative function of the Kuwaiti Majlis Al-Ummah includes debating the laws by decree which the emir issues in the absence of parliament. However, these laws are to be presented to parliament within 15 days of the date of their issuance if the Majlis was standing or in the first session in case of its dissolution or expiry of the legislative period. If they are not thus presented, they lose their power retrospectively without the need to issue a decision to this effect.

The Emir joins parliament in amending the constitution. However, amendments may not be proposed before 5 years after the constitution has been in force.

The Kuwaiti experiment demonstrates, in practice, the extent of the hegemony of the executive power. Often the emir would dissolve parliament in case of escalation of tension between them following parliament's rejection of some draft laws presented by the emir as happened in 1976 and 1986.

The Kuwaiti parliamentary experiment after the Gulf War witnessed an increasing role of the elected parliament in monitoring, questioning and requesting greater powers for the Majlis vis-a-vis the executive power. The Majlis also raised the question of the need to revise the laws passed in its absence, especially those concerned with human rights, women suffrage (voting and nomination) and citizenship, Furthermore, parliament passed a set of important laws concerned with educational issues, housing, independence of the judiciary and retirement. It also approved Kuwait's accession to several international treaties such as the international treaty to oppose torture and two world conventions on civil political, economical, social and cultural rights.

In the aftermath of the 1996 elections and the victory of the loyalists, Majlis Al-Ummah (parliament) lost of its influence in favor of the government. This profound change was reflected in the Majlis's performance. Consequently, no law was passed during the first legislative period despite the existence of many draft laand law proposals on the parliament's agenda.

In the second legislative period, parliament passed a law on by-elections, debated the issues of employment and medical insurance, and considered establishing a special investigation committee on the spreading of drug use. `In 1996 , parliament also approved the amendment of the Kuwaiti judiciary law system.

The year 1998 saw a series of confrontations between government and Majlis. Consequently, the government resigned on March 16, 1998 and it was re-formed after introducing some changes. This situation prompted the crown prince to complain to the emir that governmental work is stumbling and that cooperation between government and Majlis has become impossible. As a result, the emir issued a decree dissolving Majlis Al-Ummah on May 4, 1999 before the Majlis completing its constitutional term in accordance with article 107 of the constitution.

When the Majlis was dissolved in 1996, it still had 23 laws on its agenda. The 1996 Majlis witnessed a reduction in its productivity to half of that of the 1992 Majlis.

The 1999 Majlis, despite the fact that it did not complete its term, witnessed a confrontation with the government on the issue of the decrees passed during its absence. The government took advantage of the Majlis's absence to issue about 60 decrees, especially the one concerned with women's right on nomination to and voting in elections.

Early in August 1999, the new Majlis decided to refer the controversial decrees to the specialized parliamentary committees. Consequently, the Majlis rejected all the laws issued by decree that were passed in its absence (dissolution) including the decree concerned with women's political rights.

Morocco has had a parliamentary experience since the 1960s. However, this experiment in parliamentary work did not develop enough neither in its legal structure, nor in term of performance and impact. As a result, it remained below the people's aspiration for political, social and economic modernization.

In 1996, Morocco conducted a popular referendum on constitutional amendments. Consequently, parliament, according to article 36 of the 1996 constitution, came to be constituted of two chambers: the House of Representatives and the Council of Advisers. The House's term was reduced from six to five years and the Council's term became nine years with one third of its members selected every three years. Pursuant to this development, Morocco witnessed in 1997 the first parliamentary elections in accordance with the new constitution which opened the way to the opposition to reach power for the first time in Morocco's political history. For this reason, the study concentrated on analyzing the extent of parliament's effectiveness in the legislative domain.

The Moroccan parliament is the second constitutional institution in the country after the monarchy. The Moroccan parliamentary experiment does not overstep the monarchy as a hereditary system, but could be considered as one of its pillars. The Moroccan parliament was established within the framework of the monarchy by a constitution which it introduced. This fact asserts the ascendancy of the legitimacy of the monarchy with its historical, religious and constitutional background over the electoral legitimacy of the parliament.

In addition, the Moroccan parliamentary experiment included several periods of interruption when Morocco witnessed intervals of a state of emergency. Morocco has known six parliamentary phases separated by several years sometimes.

The study concentrated on some of these periods with the aim of presenting a relatively clear picture of parliamentary life of Morocco. The first parliamentary experiment began in 1963 and ended in 1965 with the declaration of the state of emergency in the country. This parliament debated the 1964 and 1965 budgets as well as a number of political and social issues concerned with education, labor, health, the judiciary, Arabization and some foreign policy issues such as the frontiers, the Arab League and common Arab market. In this respect, the opposition played a role in proposing a number of laws related to land reform, unifying the courts, Arabizing the judiciary and the public administration, the nationalization of the sugar industry and the amendment of the press law. However, this parliament issued a limited number of laws.

The second parliamentary experiment extended from 1970 to 1971 and the third experiment from 1977 to 1984 which continued until now. During the third parliamentary mandate from 1977-1984, the government presented 153 draft laws and parliament approved 131 of them. In contrast, the parliamentary blocs and the independent MPs presented 94 law proposals and parliament approved 14 of them only despite the importance of a number of them. Moreover, the MPs presented 149 petitions and parliament agreed to 35 of them.

In the fourth parliamentary mandate (1984-1992), the government presented 74 draft laws and the MP's presented 46 law proposals and parliament approved 4 of them only. On the other hand, parliament approved 67 petitions presented by MPs.

The legislative performance of the Moroccan parliament in three consecutive legislative periods reflected its fluctuations and relative ineffectiveness in legislation and demonstrated clearly the government's domination of legislative work.

Despite the numerous functions of the Moroccan parliament -legislative, financial, oversight, foundational and diplomatic- the substance and procedural practice of these functions are organized in a manner which deprive them of much of their value and effectiveness so as to render parliament submissive to the executive power.

The present Moroccan constitution in section 46 diminished parliament's legislative power and defined it in a very restrictive way. As if this was not sufficient, it permitted the delegation of parliament's legislative power, despite its limitation, to the government while it did not permit the government to delegate its legislative powers to parliament. In addition, the Moroccan parliament is subject to government as far as legislative procedures are concerned in such a manner that the government is given absolute priority over parliament as far as the legislative regulations go. The government controls the parliament's agenda and it is usually given priority for debating the draft laws presented by it.

Parliament's limited legislative powers are also demonstrated in its restricted power in financial matters and in the king's legislative priority in this domain. The king's power vis-à-vis parliament render him the legislator par excellence since he controls the course of a law from inception to implementation. Furthermore, the king reserves the right to address parliament without being questioned and to interfere in the parliamentary legislative agenda. He also enjoys the right to order the implementation of a law, to request the holding of a referendum, to dissolve parliament and to overtake parliament's powers in exceptional and transitional situations.

The study remarked, in assessing the outcome of the legislative experiment for the Moroccan parliament, that the government resorts intensively to a set of procedures that give it the right to control parliament's work and that grant it priority over the right of amendments by rejecting parliamentary amendments, especially those presented by the opposition. However, change has appeared with the Yusufi government. More interest has been shown in political and economic matters, and to a lesser extent, in social matters.

In general, there are currently signs of a new phase that the Moroccan parliament might witness. These signs are enhanced by the internal and international democratic transformations, in addition to the increasing social pressure and the increasing rise of the level of political awareness among the citizens.

In conjunction with the president of the republic, the Yemeni parliament performs several functions. The most important of these functions are: nominating presidential candidates, approving laws issued by decree by the president of the republic, accepting the president's resignation, performing the president's tasks should the presidency become vacant and bringing charges against the president and senior civil servants for treason, breach of the constitution or any other action that violates the independence and sovereignty of the country.

In its relation with government, the parliament performs, among others, the following functions:
1) Grant government a vote of confidence;
2) Monitor government's actions by: giving advice and proposing topics for discussion, forming committees and requesting a parliamentary committee to find facts and examine government's executive branches either by asking questions or by interrogation;
3) Accept or reject draft laws presented by government;
4) Approve plans for development projects, the annual budget and end of year accounts in addition to the government general policy.

In his relation with parliament, the president performs, among others, the following functions:
1) Invite electors to elect the parliament;
2) Invite the parliament to convene within two weeks of the date of the announcement of the parliamentary election results;
3) Perform legislative tasks between legislative cycles or during parliament's dissolution by issuing laws by decree;
4) Request parliament to revise a law within 30 days of its submission to it;
5) Issue the laws approved by parliament and insure their publication in the official gazette;
6) Approve the treaties and agreements ratified by parliament and the laws its adopts and which do not become effective without this presidential approval;
7) Dissolve parliament on condition of conducting a popular referendum on the causes of dissolution.

On the other hand, government performs the following functions:
1) Propose a draft law and its amendment;
2) Issue the by-laws and regulations;
3) Hold a ministerial portfolio in conjunction with membership in parliament.

To a large extent, the Yemeni parliament enjoys great powers. It elects the 5-member presidential council, gives or withholds confidence from government, votes laws and reserves the exclusive right of law making. This renders the Yemeni political system a parliamentary one with two branches of executive power.

In 1990, the Yemeni parliament established 17 committees and they increased to 19 committees in 1997. These committees performed the greater part of the legislative and oversight roles of parliament, but the legislative role had the greatest share. The scrutiny role of the Yemeni parliament remains limited.

In principle, the Yemeni parliament performs three functions: political, financial and legislative.

The legislative function constitutes the fundamental role of parliament and legislations passe through three stages: Proposition, debating and voting and finally approval and issuing of law. According to the constitution, each draft law presented by government is referred to a specialized parliamentary committee for examination and this committee presents a report about it. On the other hand, a law proposal by MPs is referred to a special committee that considers its lawfulness before it is referred to a parliamentary committee. Furthermore, a rejected law proposal may not be presented a second time in the same legislative cycle while a draft law presented by government may be considered a second time in the same legislative cycle.

The study then deals with the legislative role which the first parliament, after unification, performed between 1990-1993. This parliament represented the transition period in the unification process of Yemen. It consisted of the 270 former MPs of North and South Yemen, in addition to 31 members appointed by the presidential council of united Yemen. This parliament sought to legislate for a united state. It actually adopted a number of key legislations which organized the political and social life in Yemen, debated a number of economic and political issues and approved several international and bilateral treaties. Two major achievements of the transition period were parliament's commissioning of the presidential council to hold a popular referendum on the constitution on May 15 and 16, 1991 and appointing the supreme elections committee which made the necessary preparations for parliamentary elections on April 27, 1993.

Consequently, the elections took place by direct, free, and general secret ballot, under the umbrella of a pluralistic party competition. The new parliament was given back the functions suspended by article 7 of the declaration of the united Republic of Yemen, namely the nomination and election of members of the presidential council; commissioning the presidential council to continue performing its tasks in exceptional cases when it is not possible to hold elections; acceptance or rejection of the resignation of the president and members of the presidential council; approval of constitutional amendments.

The end of the transition period witnessed the election of a new parliament in 1993 which remained in power until 1997. This parliament accomplished much despite the challenges that accompanied its tenure, especially the secession crisis of 1994. Despite the constitutional amendments that followed this crisis which strengthened the presidency at the expense of parliament, parliament preserved a power balance vis-à-vis the presidency.

On April 27, 1997, parliamentary elections took place the new parliament, however, succeeded in accomplishing a modest number of legislative decisions of its own in comparison with what the government succeeded in promulgating by presidential decrees and parliament failed to reject any of them despite the constitutional powers vested in it.

Finally, the study points out a number of general results for a number of cases. The most important of them are:
1) The constitutional framework for these cases consecrates, in one way or another, the dominance of the legislative power over the executive power;
2) There is a clear political imbalance in some parliaments, considered by this study, because of ruling the majority party, which represents the government, has the upper hand in legislation;
3) The representative base from which the Arab legislative councils emanate is restricted in some cases because of the electoral laws which deprive certain social segments-like women in Kuwait- from participation in the electoral process as a whole;
4) There are circumstances external to the legislative institution which affected some these parliament experiments, and led to the complete absence of from the political arena; during certain periods;
5) Parliamentary elections may be conducive to the arrival of conservative elements who adopt a [political] behavior that is hostile to the essence of democracy and is natural product of traditional political and cultural upbringing and social conditions;
6) There is a clear preponderance of government draft laws over laws proposed by MPs.