The study sets two conditions that must be fulfilled in order for the oversihgt institutions to perform their role as required. The first concerns the parliaments themselves: their power, ability and desire to monitor the executive power. The second concerns the prevailing political education; the citizen's view of parliament; the circumstances surrounding parliamentary elections as a tool of participation in democratic life; the political parties' role in developing the democratic process and the transfer of power.

The first section of the study attempted to lay the groundwork for the circumstances of the development of the monitoring role of parliaments by reviewing the most prominent political and technical developments in the world and their impact on enhancing the role of the legislative power. As for the political developments, the study noted the spread of democratic parliamentary systems in an increasing number of the world's countries. The number of these countries rose from 66 in 1988 to 99 in 1993 and to 117 in 1998. The democratization of these countries was accompanied by a parallel development, namely the application of democratic principles and more respect for human rights. Consequently, the number of "free societies" that are committed to these principles rose from 58 in 1988 to 81 in 1998. The study based these indicators on the criteria of the American association, "Freedom House".

Moreover, the study points out in this context to the collapse of the one-party model of government and the ongoing revision of the parliamentary institution as the representative of public interests and the body that monitors and corrects the performance of the executive power.

The study also referred to the technical developments in the 1990s –especially the communications revolution- that impacted strongly on parliamentary work in the world and the scrutiny role of parliaments. This revolution has facilitated communications in an unprecedented way among individuals and between the state's legislative and executive institutions. The communications revolution has been translated into new projects in several countries such as "elections by telephone" in New Zealand, "telephone democracy" in Holland or into similar project in Greece and Britain. There is also one American project, which is still under study, which calls for the establishment of information infra-structures to protect and support liberty and democracy in the world. These projects have stirred a wave of responses of support and opposition to the developments ushering in "electronic democracy".

The study however, considers that these developments, which the world has witnessed on the political and technical levels, would advance parliamentary work and the oversight role of parliament worldwide. From this general framework, section two of the study looked at the reflection of these world developments on the Arab parliamentary experiment, and in particular, on their role in monitoring the executive power. In this context, the study reviews the Arab parliamentary monitorial tools in their legal framework, practice and impact.

Asking questions represents a monitoring tool that parliaments employ. The by-laws organize the interrogation process according to some conditions such as the necessity for the question to be brief, its subject to be coherent and not repeated, the words to be decent and not to violate the principles of the constitution.

Questions, according to a number of by-laws of Arab parliaments, are addressed in writing to the speaker, and often addressed to the prime minister, to the ministers or to one minister only. This procedure depends on the by-laws of each parliament.

The Arab parliaments' by-laws set the time limit for ministers to answer the questions addressed to them. These time limits vary from one Arab parliament to another. Also questions vary depending on whether they are written or oral. Some by-laws give the MPs the opportunity to comment on the government's answers to their questions. Furthermore, changing the question to interrogation or to a proposal for discussion is a right confined to some Arab parliaments and not others. However, this procedure itself is regulated by specific conditions.

In practice, there seems often to be political goals for asking questions in parliament. On the one hand, the opposition aims to shed the light on the shortcomings and the negative aspects on the government's performance. On the other hand, supporters of the government among the MPs ask questions in order to give the government the opportunity to speak about its accomplishments and to highlight its successes in running the country. Most questions raised in Arab parliaments deal with local issues while some question the government about its performance in foreign affairs and policy. The questions directed to local issues reflect the concentration of political activity in the big cities or the capitals of Arab countries as well as the weakness of the elected local councils and their limited role.

Asking questions is considered the most widespread monitoring tool in Arab parliaments in comparison with other tools. This situation is also due to two reasons. One is constitutional. There are constitutional obstacles that impede the use of other oversight tools. Two is political. This is the numerical weakness of the opposition and the independent MPs. Although Arab parliaments use questioning as a basic control tool, there is a great difference between these parliaments and the parliaments of developed Western countries.

In Arab parliaments, oral questions exceed written questions. This might be due to the fact that oral questions are given priority in parliamentary debates because they are transmitted by television and radio and, hence, public opinion can follow them live.

On the other hand, the answers of governments to MP questions in Arab parliaments are similar, in ratio and substance, to the governments’ answers in the advanced Western parliaments. This ratio in the Moroccan parliaments for 1977 and 1981 is about 41%which is the same for the British House of Commons.

Furthermore, some participants consider hat the answers of Arab governments are of a general nature and they do not furnish new information. Moreover, they avoid referring to sensitive issues especially those of a general national character. In addition, asking questions in Arab parliaments is not adequately employed in comparison with Western governments neither in term of numbers nor in term of the diversity of subjects.

Proposing a decision is another monitoring tool. It calls on the government to perform an important action that is within its function as government. This action is possible by-laws of some and not all Arab parliaments. For example, it is included in both Kuwait and Egypt, but the conditions of its use are different.

In practice, this tool is more used by MPs who support the government or the executive power. In Lebanon, for example, the parliamentary by-laws do not include this form of action. However, MPs are used to it in the form of law proposals, by reaching prior agreement with the executive power. On the other hand, Arab parliaments’ experience does not show that the opposition MPs employ this tool extensively due to their limited influence.

The third tool of parliamentary monitorship is the formation of investigation committees. Often, there are two types of investigation committees: Permanent and fact-finding committees. Permanent investigation committees are classified according to specialization and they differ in number from one parliament to another; fact-finding committees are ad hoc committees formed by parliament for special purposes often upon a suggestion fom some MPs, a suggestion from one of parliament's committees or by royal will.

In practice, for parliamentary committees to succeed in shouldering the tasks entrusted to them, conditions of free operation must be satisfied including adequate information and investigative powers.

Arab parliamentary investigation committees face several difficulties despite having achieved important accomplishments. Some have even dealt with quite sensitive issues. Examples of these are Jordan's experience with corruption and Lebanon's telephone tapping by some security agencies. However, the work of committees does not always bear fruit. Some attribute this situation to the failure of these committees, especially fact-finding committees, to keep the executive power from interfering in their activities and even pressuring sometime their members.

The fourth parliamentary monitoring action is interrogation and the motion of confidence. Resort to this action is restricted by conditions that differ from one Arab parliament to another. In some cases, interrogation could be exercised by a single MP as is the case in Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan while, in Algeria, at least 30 MPs are needed in order to permit interrogation of government. On the other hand, in Lebanon a motion of confidence in a minister or the government should be requested by at least 10 MPs as is the case in Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan.

A government falls if the interrogation debate ends by parliament agreeing to a vote of no confidence. In practice, the use of the interrogation and the motion of confidence in Arab parliaments has been extended in the 1990s. Interrogation has been employed in certain cases to obtain information about some sensitive issues like the conduct excesses of some police stations in Egypt or violations attributed to the Kuwait minister of finance. While these attempts have failed in Lebanon, Palestine and Morocco, the Jordanian parliament succeeded for the first time since the early 1960s in forcing the government to resign in 1990.

Although the use of the interrogation tool expanded in the 1990s in some Arab parliaments, the general tendency has been one of contraction in comparison with the resort to questioning. This is an indication of intentional policies by the executive power bent on avoiding, being interrogated under the pretext of preserving a favorable atmosphere for foreign investments in the country. Such a phenomenon is not limited to Arab parliaments and it includes parliaments in Western countries like France.

Another monitoring tool of Arab parliaments is the debate of a general issue. According to the by-laws of the Jordanian parliament, an issue is debated as a form of "exchange of opinions and consultation" between parliament and government. At least 10 MPs in the Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian parliaments and at least 5 MPs in the Kuwaiti parliament should propose the issue for discussion. On the other hand, the government may raise an issue for discussion for the sake of sounding the opinion of parliament.

In the 1990s, Arab parliaments persisted in exercising their right in suggesting a general issue for discussion. In some instances, these sessions were transmitted live by television thus raising great interest among the public as was the case in Oman and the UAE.

These debates dealt with various issues such as government performance, crime and national budget. On the other hand, interest in sensitive issues such as national security and foreign policy was weak in some parliaments. The debates in Arab parliaments reflected sometimes real, vital and significant differences. The profundity and the force of these debates were linked to the development of political parties and parliamentary blocs. Arab parliaments that did not have parties and blocs witnessed a contraction and weakness in the performance of parliamentarians. And in the case of the dominance of a ruling party over parliamentary life, the debates were confined in their majority to the ruling party's MPs.

The last possible action of Arab parliamentarians is criminal indictment. Some constitutions of Arab republics permit parliament to indict the president of the republic for treason, a crime or breach of the constitution as is the case in the Lebanese constitution. Furthermore, Arab constitutions grant parliaments the right to indict or question ministers or to try them.

In practice, impeaching the president of a republic is a rare event in the world and the same is true of the trial of ministers. The same situation applies to the Arab parliamentary experience as no Arab parliament proposed the impeachment of an incumbent head of state despite the occurrence of some confrontations which did not take place in accordance with the parliamentary monitoring mechanisms and tools. During the past decade, not a single criminal indictment was directed against a head of state by Arab parliaments. However, this tool was sometimes employed against some ministers. In 1992 in Jordan, the prime minister and two of his ministers were accused of "corruption and misuse of public funds". In this case, parliament approved the indictment of the two ministers, but not the prime minister.

The experiments of Arab parliaments show that indicting ministers is not an easy matter. Actually, Arab parliaments are closer to the situation of the British parliament in the nineteenth century as far as the relations between parliaments, ministers and heads of states are concerned. Ministers enjoy political and legal immunity vis-à-vis MPs in general and the opposition MPs in particular.

The third section of the study surveys some of the final conclusions on the internal situations of Arab parliaments, their powers and their ability to exercise their monitoring role. In view of the internal condition of Arab parliaments, the study considers that a number of these parliaments are equipped with the proper legal framework to perform their parliamentary work while others suffer from lack of legislations in this respect. Moreover, a comparison of the Arab parliamentary experience with that of the parliaments of Western countries shows that the legal factor is not the decisive factor in the deficiency of Arab parliaments in performing their monitoring role.

Arab parliamentary officials attribute the cause of this deficiency to the paucity of parliaments in the necessary facilities such as the information centers, supporting technical agencies and administratively qualified personnel. In contrast, some Arab parliaments, like the Lebanese and Palestinian parliaments, have made remarkable progress in providing these facilities. Moreover, the study asserts that Arab parliaments comprise élite members with specializations and qualifications that would enable them to reasonably contribute to monitoring work if the suitable conditions, material as well as technical, are satisfied.

Arab parliamentary activity still suffers from the absence of diverse and specialized research centers that could be relied on in debatiwith and monitoring the government. Moreover, monitoring government performance essentially requires the collection of first-hand data from their original sources: the public administrations and departments or from those who have important information about government activities. Making this information available to an MP requires that the MP guarantees to those who give the information that they will not be exposed to negative reactions from government.

The study also pointed out to the impediments which prevent Arab parliaments from performing their monitoring role. The most salient impediments are: 1) The dominant political culture in the Arab world. There is a prevalent feeling in most Arab countries that governments do what they wish regardless of what parliaments and citizens want. This situation affects the citizen's willingness to cooperate with parliaments in enhancing its authority to fulfill its scrutinity role. 2) Internal political conditions. The Arab region is considered one of the least democratically developed regions of the world and many Arab states do not have the political parties that could participate in activating the monitoring role of parliaments. 3) Social and economic conditions. Many Arab states suffer from the imbalance between the state and the citizenry and between governments and civil societies. Governments and states dominate the citizens and civil societies. One of the important causes of this imbalance is the contemporary expansion of state bureaucracy at the expense of civil society organizations and associations. This situation affects the role which parliaments play in political life and the exercise of their monitoring role under the hegemony of benefit-giving states which, in turn, limits society’s ability to popular monitoring.

In Section Four, the study reviews some of the ideas for developing the monitoring role of Arab parliaments. These ideas include some practical steps inside and outside parliaments.

Inside parliaments, the study recommended the following steps:
1) Revision of the legal framework which define the relations of Arab parliaments with the executive power and the reduction of restrictions by the by-laws on some aspects of parliamentary monitoring.
2) Provision of MPs with assistants from among the researchers, specialized personnel and administrators.
3) Development of the work of parliamentary committees.
4) Provision of parliaments with well equipped libraries.
5) Organization of educational workshops for Arab MPs seeking to improve their monitoring capacities.
6) Holding more Arab regional forums for MPs, especially on monitoring government performance.
7) Encouraging independent MPs to form parliamentary blocs.

Outside parliament, the study recommended the following steps:
1. Developing the Arab citizen's interest in parliamentary life, and his confidence in parliamentary work and elections.
2. Enhancing the role of parties and parliamentary blocs as well as enhancing the atmosphere for a democratic transfer of power.
3. Emphasizing the role of the United Nations and the international specialized agencies in supporting the process of democratic transformation as well as developing the monitoring role of parliaments.
4. Encouraging independent civil society associations and NGOs to contribute more to general elections, to undertake to monitor government performance and to urge MPs to enhance their monitoring of the executive power.