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# Real time evaluation of UNHCR's IDP operation in Somalia

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## Evaluation summary

In January 2007, UNHCR issued a document titled 'Policy Framework and implementation Strategy: UNHCR's role in support of an enhanced humanitarian response to situations of internal displacement'. The primary purpose of this document was to set out the key principles and objectives guiding UNHCR's engagement with internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the context of the UN's humanitarian reform process, and in particular, within the new institutional arrangements known as "the Cluster Approach".

This real-time evaluation (RTE) report is one in a series which seeks to analyze and assess UNHCR's initial experience in the implementation of the Cluster Approach, with the aim of identifying lessons learned and effective practices which may be drawn upon as that approach is rolled out to other ongoing humanitarian emergencies. The evaluation process also provided an early opportunity to review field operations in the light of the IDP Policy Framework referred to above, together with UNHCR's policy paper on "The Protection of IDPs and the Role of UNHCR", issued in February 2007. The countries selected for evaluation are those in which the Cluster Approach was first activated (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Uganda and Somalia), together with Chad where a cluster-like arrangement was in place at the time when the first RTE was undertaken.

This evaluation report is based on a mission to Somalia that was undertaken from 2 - 10 July 2007. The evaluation team consisted of three UNHCR staff members: Neill Wright (Senior Coordinator for IDP Operations), Enda Savage (IDP Advisory Team) and Esther Kiragu (Senior Policy Officer, Policy Development and Evaluation Service). The team visited IDP locations and held discussions with beneficiaries in several sites in Baidoa, (Hanana 1, Kormara, Bonkay), Garowe, (Camp 4), Galkayo (Bulo Baley), and Bosasso (Tawal).

A half-day workshop on humanitarian reform was conducted for UNHCR BO Somalia staff based in Nairobi. Extensive briefing sessions were held with the Representative and key staff both in BO Somalia as well as field locations visited by the RTE team. Meetings were also held with the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, and other representatives of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for the Country Team of Somalia, (*hereinafter referred to as the IASC CT*), (UNOCHA, UNICEF, HABITAT, ICRC and UNDP). The team also met with government officials in all locations, including the Governor of Baidoa, Director-General Ministry of Interior in Puntland, Minister for Planning in Puntland, District Commissioner Galkayo, the Police Commissioner Galkayo and Clan Elders/traditional and religious leaders of South Galkayo. The mission held extensive discussions with both local and international NGOs partners in the Cluster Approach such as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

The initial findings and key recommendations of the evaluation were presented to UNHCR staff in BO Somalia, IASC CT representatives, and other stakeholders prior to the mission's departure from Nairobi. Similarly, and in a series of presentations,

key findings were shared with UNHCR headquarter staff in Geneva after the mission.

### **Key findings and recommendations**

This real time evaluation mission followed an earlier mission by the UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner (Operations) that was conducted between 30 April and 5 May 2007. Most of the findings and conclusions of that high-level mission in so far as they relate to the implementation of the Cluster Approach are also elaborated on in this report. The RTE mission concentrated on UNHCR's experience in the implementation of the Cluster Approach, especially in addressing the latest humanitarian emergency in the light of ongoing fighting in and around Mogadishu and other parts of South-Central Somalia, and the thousands displaced as a result. While most were displaced to the Shabelle Region, tens of thousands have also been displaced further north in the Bay Region and southern areas of Puntland.

Despite the formal adoption of the Cluster Approach in July 2006, its operational implementation in Somalia did not commence in areas other than Bosasso and Somaliland until early 2007. As explained, this was partly because of problems of access and increasing insecurity in parts of the country; the unpredictability of the situation with all the programming/planning challenges that this entails; and insufficient and inconsistent field staff presence in southern Puntland and South-Central Somalia limiting the overall capacity to effectively implement the Cluster Approach in these areas.

While remote management of operations from Nairobi seems likely to continue given the current security situation in Somalia, increased implementation of the Cluster Approach urgently requires a new common strategic framework for humanitarian intervention for IDPs and others of concern.

The evaluation team found that agencies and NGOs are largely operating according to their separate mandates, with limited coordination; with minimal common needs assessment or mutually agreed priorities, varying target regions, and multiple beneficiaries. A Joint Action Plan establishing agreed target beneficiaries, as well as priorities for protection, humanitarian relief and early recovery activities could significantly strengthen the impact of programme implementation. The UN and non-governmental partners in the Cluster Approach are also, as a result of their bilateral activity, exposed to risks associated with manipulation by other stakeholders (beneficiaries and local authorities included), duplication of efforts, and dissipation of impact. In a vast country with needs as enormous as Somalia, the implementation of the Cluster Approach demands a united approach in which all partners speak with one voice, in order to enhance the predictability, coordination, accountability and partnership foreseen by the IASC in its guidance on implementing the Cluster Approach.

The following are the general recommendations arising from the consultations with stakeholders during the mission. They are divided in two sets, but are mutually reinforcing. The first set is UNHCR-specific, and the second is systemic - addressing the overall implementation of the Cluster Approach in Somalia.

*UNHCR-specific issues*

- It is strongly recommended that a review of staffing take place to ensure a more effective field presence – especially in Garowe, Galkayo and Baidoa - as well as a more effective balance in terms of the seniority required for cluster-management issues in Nairobi and for the cluster lead and head of Field Office responsibilities in Puntland and South-Central Somalia.
- The UNHCR presence in Galkayo and Baidoa requires urgent strengthening in order to respond effectively to the recent internal displacement from Mogadishu.
- In general, the evaluation team felt there was a clear need to increase the number of posts in the field, (as opposed to using short term missions), commensurate with the size of the operation, including levels sufficiently senior to provide effective cluster leadership in protection, CCCM, and shelter, and in a way that would enable devolution of decision-making to the field wherever possible.
- For the Protection Cluster to begin to deliver effective protection in southern Puntland and South-Central Somalia, a new strategy needs to be urgently developed with UNOCHA (as the co-lead), containing clear roles and responsibilities, and with the agreed engagement of sister agencies and major NGOs.
- It is suggested that, along with UNHCR's protection partners, a joint needs assessment of the internally displaced and others in urgent humanitarian need in southern Puntland and accessible areas of South-Central Somalia should be carried out, and the results form the basis for developing a joint strategy for protection activities.
- UNHCR and HABITAT, as co-leads of the Shelter Cluster, need to build support for their vision of how emergency shelter support for the newly displaced fits into their joint longer term shelter strategy, rather than emergency shelter being seen by some as an NFI distribution activity. Consideration should also be given to the replication of the Bosasso pilot project to other parts of southern Puntland and accessible areas of South-Central Somalia.
- UNHCR field participation in other non-UNHCR-led cluster meetings is essential to address cross-cutting issues, and to ensure that all clusters take protection issues into consideration.
- UNHCR's population movement tracking and protection monitoring network is providing valuable data to many actors. Nevertheless, the team felt that analysis of that data and using it to reinforce planning and implementation arrangements can still be strengthened.
- BO Somalia and its field staff are encouraged to seek further support from the global clusters, especially in terms of policy guidance, training and operational tools

*Systemic issues*

- There is a need to strengthen the implementation of the Cluster Approach in southern Puntland and South-Central Somalia, including the development of a new strategic framework for Cluster Approach activities throughout the country, including target beneficiary definition, programme implementation responsibilities, and coordination responsibilities, as well as clear *modus operandi*.
- The inter-cluster coordination function has recently been enhanced through the deployment of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator's Representatives both to Somaliland and to Puntland; UNOCHA's contribution to this role should be considered, and where appropriate strengthened.
- Community-based approach and consensus-building processes need a high priority in the challenging situation in Somalia - using involvement and substantive participation of the authorities at all levels, (the central, regional and local levels inclusive of traditional and religious leaders), the beneficiaries, influential members of civil society, and other relevant stakeholders in priority target areas agreed upon by the IASC CT.
- The evaluation team felt that sufficient safe access exists in some parts of the country for the extension of the cluster approach from the remote management hub in Nairobi to field operations in Somalia. This entails higher operational costs, strengthened field leadership, field coordination capacity, as well as greater operational staff presence from actors (including UNHCR) in locations such as Baidoa, Garowe and Galkayo.
- Field staffing enhancements should not just increase numbers commensurate with the size of the operation, but also take into consideration the necessary profile and seniority sufficient to provide day-to-day leadership and to effectively engage with interlocutors - including government actors and their local authorities, as well as with other stakeholders.
- There is a need to enhance existing information management mechanisms, particularly in sharing information between clusters, and in analyzing the data available.
- An ongoing process of training all staff in humanitarian reform, roles and responsibilities, and in lessons learned from other operations, is required to enhance greater understanding of individual, agency and NGO contributions to implementing the cluster approach within Somalia.
- The RC/HC and IASC CT should consider the activation of a stand-alone early recovery cluster in order to ensure a smooth transition between the humanitarian emergency and early recovery phases. The cluster's activation could perhaps already start in Somaliland and northern Puntland, and be extended to other areas as the situation permits.
- The IASC CT might benefit from seeking greater engagement of donors to ensure that the additional resources required to support a strengthened implementation

of the Cluster Approach within Somalia are available; and where appropriate, consider further approaches for CERF funding.



## Historical background

1. Since the ousting of the military government headed by the then President Mohammed Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia has had no central government to date. Currently it is administered independently by three zonal governance structures: Somaliland, which declared its unilateral independence after the ousting of Siad Barre; Puntland, which is a self-autonomous state but unlike Somaliland considers itself part of the federal government and its future; and South-Central Somalia, which is currently largely administered by the Transitional Federal Government. There are also disputed territories such as Sool and Sanaag regions on the boundary between Somaliland and Puntland which have been a source of additional conflict. South of Puntland, there is a clan border with South-Central Somalia with a geographic boundary commonly called the “green line”, across Mudug Region. While both Mudug and Galgadud regions harbour self-determination interests, currently northern Mudug remains under the Puntland authorities while southern Mudug and Galgadud is under traditional leadership, (the Sultanate, as well as tradition religious and clan leaders).

2. Following numerous peace talks, the Transitional National Government, (*hereinafter referred to as the TNG*) was formed in Djibouti in 2000. Unfortunately, clan-based factional leaders unhappy with the 2000 Djibouti transitional arrangements continued to fuel the violence that persisted until 2002. After two years of further peace-talks sponsored by the Inter Governmental Authority and Development (commonly referred to as IGAD), a power-sharing agreement was brokered at a conference in Nairobi in August 2004, and Transitional Federal Institutions were agreed upon. The Transitional Federal Charter is the principal organizing document of the new Republic. There is a 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament. The Transitional Federal Government (*hereinafter referred to as the TFG*) was headed at the time of this evaluation by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, with his appointee, Professor Ali Mohammed Gedi, as Prime Minister.

3. The security situation inside Somalia and especially in and around the capital Mogadishu continues to be fragile, and the new transitional government (currently based in Mogadishu) is still struggling to exercise effective control within and outside Mogadishu. In early 2006, warring clans/factions controlled Mogadishu from February until June, when the Islamic Courts Union, (*hereinafter the ICU*) fought for and gained control. In December with the help of Ethiopian forces, the TFG managed to expel the ICU from Mogadishu and most of South-Central Somalia, and the TFG, with the support of Ethiopian forces, was at the time of the mission still largely in control of the region.

4. Fearing a spill-over of fighting into its territory, the Ethiopian Government deployed forces into Somalia and, at the time of the evaluation, these forces were still there. This remains a contentious issue, with some elements in the opposition demanding their total withdrawal from Somalia before those elements will agree to participate in the proposed National Reconciliation Conference.

5. A peacekeeping force, known as the African Union Mission in Somalia, (*referred to hereinafter as AMISOM*) was deployed on 20 February 2007. The deployment was for an initial period of six months, and aimed to contribute to the initial stabilization phase, with prospects of it eventually evolving into a United Nations peacekeeping operation that would support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict restoration of Somalia. According to its mandate, AMISOM was *inter alia* going to support free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in the national reconciliation and political dialogue process; to protect the Transitional Federal Institutions; to provide security for key infrastructure and also, within its capabilities, to contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

6. The maximum authorized strength of AMISOM is 7,650 ground troops, plus maritime and air components<sup>1</sup>. Unfortunately, and despite pledges from member states of the African Union, only Uganda provided troops, which numbered 1,700 personnel at the time of the evaluation in July 2007. Despite the fact that they have not taken part in hostilities, AMISOM troops have come under attack. On 30 March 2007, one AMISOM soldier was killed and three others injured when the place they were guarding came under mortar fire. On 16 May 2007, four other soldiers were killed in a roadside bomb attack, and several others injured.

7. A request has been made by the Transitional Government for AMISOM to be replaced by a UN Peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia dated 25 June 2007<sup>2</sup> stated that such a deployment, based on lessons learned from other peacekeeping missions in Somalia (UNOSOM 1 & 11) and elsewhere, required certain pre-conditions to be in place. These include that hostilities would have to have largely ceased and the security situation throughout South-Central Somalia would have to be fairly stable. Further, that a United Nations operation would have to be broadly accepted by all clans and sub-clans - with their agreement preferably expressed in a cessation of hostilities or ceasefire agreement or declaration. It was stressed that such a UN peacekeeping operation could only succeed if it were to be deployed in support of a political process and not as a substitute for one, and therefore the immediate focus for the international community should be on promoting a ceasefire agreement and a viable all-inclusive political process. In short, the conditions were not considered ripe for such a deployment, but the Report pledged to find ways to assist the African Union's AMISOM.

8. Towards the ultimate goal of the TFG establishing a viable all-inclusive political process, a National Reconciliation Conference was convened on 15 July 2007, after two postponements. About 1,000 delegates attended, but it was suspended and marred by security problems which are still ongoing. There was widespread criticism that the agenda for the conference seemed to exclude the key issue of power-sharing; that the TFG had dominated the process; that there had been an absence of neutral observers to monitor the process; and more importantly that there had been a boycott

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<sup>1</sup> For further details refer to the Reports of the African Union on the origins, composition and mandate of the AMISOM. This was endorsed/authorized by the UN Security Council, (Security Council Resolution 1744(2007) adopted on 20 February 2007).

<sup>2</sup> "Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia", presented to the Security Council on 25 June 2007, S/2007/381.

by the main opposition groups who had demanded the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces before they would participate.

9. The security situation in and around Mogadishu therefore remains volatile, resulting in an unpredictable operational context especially in those areas curtailing humanitarian access. Nevertheless, in other parts of Somalia, some safe access does exist. This scenario provides the backdrop against which humanitarian agencies are operating in a quest to deliver humanitarian assistance and support to the Somali people.



## Operational context and humanitarian situation

10. During the many years without a functioning government, and as a result of the raging civil wars, the country suffered tremendous destruction and neglect. In addition to the physical damage of infrastructure, the foundations and institutions of the society were also greatly eroded in terms of functional capacity. Together with natural disasters, drought, the tsunami strike and ice-rain have contributed to massive internal and external displacement in many waves since 1991.

11. The initial waves of displacements were in the period between 1991 and 2000. At the end of 2005, according to UNHCR reports, there were 250,000 displaced in Mogadishu; 70,000 in Puntland, 40,000 in South-Central Somalia and another 40,000 in Somaliland.

12. The July to August 2006 drought, and the November 2006 floods caused significant displacement in South Central Somalia. However, conflict was generally the major cause of displacement in the last two years. First was the inter-clan conflict in and around Mogadishu in early 2006, followed by the fighting between the clans and the ICU in mid-2006; finally there was the major armed confrontation between the Ethiopian-backed TFG forces and the ICU between December 2006 and January 2007, and again on a much larger scale from March to May 2007, centred mainly in and around Mogadishu. Altogether the natural disasters and conflict between 2006 and 2007 displaced approximately 400,000 people of whom reportedly some 125,000 had managed to return to Mogadishu at the time of the evaluation.

13. The latest wave of displacement at the time of writing this report was in June/July 2007 when an estimated 27,000 people fled from Mogadishu. Two thirds of the families that fled in this wave settled in provinces of the Shabelles, immediately surrounding Mogadishu. Others fled further north, including some 2,600 people who fled to Galkayo. That city currently hosts 50,000 internally displaced, and has very limited resources in terms of water and sanitation, education and health services - hence living conditions for the resident population and the new IDPs are extremely difficult.

14. The UN Country Team for Somalia under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, who is also the UN Resident Coordinator, UN Designated Official and the Resident Representative of UNDP, has its main offices for Somalia in Nairobi, Kenya. The Country Team comprises UNDP, UNHCR, UNPOS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, ILO, HABITAT, UNDSS, UNOCHA, ICAO, UNESCO, UNIFEM, UNAIDS and UNFPA among others. ICRC's delegation for Somalia is also located in Nairobi. The main international non-governmental organizations are also based in Nairobi - the key actors being the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Danish Refugee Council, CARE, OXFAM and Concern Worldwide. The humanitarian operation is remotely managed from Nairobi and implemented in Somalia, where most of the actors have an uneven presence comprising some international, but mainly national staff.

## Security

15. Since late April 2007, Mogadishu and its outlying areas have witnessed recurrent fighting, including suicide attacks using vehicle-borne explosive devices against government troops and allied Ethiopian forces. There have also been mortar attacks against Mogadishu airport and the presidential palace. Targeted assassinations have occurred, with the victims being for the most part supporters of the government or prominent figures. The United Nations has also come under attack, starting in February with an airport attack on two UN planes, (with the UNHCR Representative in one of the planes), and a convoy attacked in an incident involving a roadside bomb on 20 March 2007. The WHO office in Mogadishu was attacked by armed gunmen on 16 May 2007 and one compound guard shot and wounded. On the same day, a roadside bomb killed four AMISOM soldiers, and wounded six others. The TFG Prime Minister survived two bomb attacks in less than one month, on 17 May and 3 June 2007. The recent mortar explosions during the opening of the National Reconciliation Conference continue to raise concerns about the ongoing insecurity in Mogadishu.

16. In other parts of Somalia, clashes erupted between Puntland and Somaliland forces on 9 April 2007 over contending claims regarding the village of Dhahar in the disputed areas of Eastern Sool and Sanaag regions. Kismayo also witnessed intra-clan tensions as fighting broke out between rival militia from the Marehan and Mirjerteen sub clans of the Darood on 24 April 2007.

17. Continuing acts of banditry and lawlessness in other parts of the country have raised concerns over the safety of humanitarian staff working in these areas. Two international staff of CARE International were abducted on 8 May and released a week later.

18. This volatile security situation hampers humanitarian safe access, especially in and around Mogadishu where international staff presence is ordinarily minimal. At the time of the mission, this area was a "no-go area" and was designated by UNDSS as a Security Phase 5 zone. Much of the remainder of South-Central Somalia is at Phase 4, whereas Puntland and Somaliland are at Phase 3 or below.

19. Beyond the insecurity and various displacements mentioned above, the years of civil war and natural disasters have created a humanitarian emergency in Somalia in their own right. Some 43 per cent of the general population lives below the poverty line, 71 per cent of the population are below minimum dietary energy consumption, and the country has 82 per cent illiteracy rate - according to the UNHCR 2007 Country Operation Plan. Life expectancy is 48 years. One in every six children dies before the age of five. According to the 2006 Coordinated Appeals Process, (CAP), 2.1 million people inside Somalia are generally in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. In such a scenario, it is inevitable that there will be elements of the community preying on those to whom aid is being distributed. Against the backdrop of incidents of insecurity, especially in South-Central Somalia, but also sporadically in other parts of Somalia, the weak central, regional or district governance structures, and the general "sea" of need, makes the environment for delivery of assistance both volatile and complicated. Nevertheless, the precarious humanitarian situation necessitates urgent protection and assistance for the approximately 400,000 IDPs living amongst another estimated 600,000 vulnerable members of the population.

20. In spite of the many obstacles, some humanitarian assistance is being delivered to populations in need, but much more remains to be done. As one local female NGO humanitarian worker aptly put it during one of the consultations with the RTE mission in Galkayo *“one finger cannot wash your face, you need the whole hand and preferably both”*. This underlines the need for coordination of the activities of all the actors, and confirms beyond doubt that no one actor on its own can meet all the needs.



## Cluster activation, management and impact

### Cluster activation

21. The Cluster Approach was formally adopted in Somalia in 2006 to respond to the humanitarian crisis there. The initial areas of focus were Hargeisa, Somaliland and, Bosasso, Puntland. This cautious expansion was because agencies already had a significant presence in those locations, and safe access to the beneficiaries existed. Most of South-Central Somalia was considered generally inaccessible. However, in early 2007, following the new wave of displacement, the roll-out to other areas further south in Puntland - such as Garowe and Galkayo, as well as in the Baidoa area in south-western Somalia, commenced.

22. The IASC CT was formed soon after the formal adoption of the Cluster Approach. Since then, the following eight clusters have been activated;

- Protection - co-led by UNHCR and UNOCHA;
- Shelter - co-led by UNHCR and HABITAT;
- Agriculture - led by FAO;
- Water , Sanitation and Hygiene - led by UNICEF;
- Health - led by WHO;
- Education - led by UNICEF;
- Nutrition - also led by UNICEF; and
- Logistics - led by WFP.

23. There are also thematic sectors/working groups that have been established, such as for livelihoods - which is part of the Agricultural Cluster, and the Food Sector. Early Recovery in Somalia was not at the time of the evaluation a stand-alone cluster, but was considered a cross-cutting issue, which each of the clusters and thematic working groups is expected to incorporate in its planning and implementation. Other cross-cutting issues such as gender, environment and HIV/AIDS, are also supposed to be incorporated in each of the cluster responsibilities and, if feasible, have sub-clusters or thematic forums for better focus and attention.

### Cluster management

24. The UNCT Somalia had already adopted a Collaborative Approach prior to the introduction of the Cluster Approach in 2006, thus some coordination mechanisms established at the Nairobi level following the adoption of a formal UN strategy on IDPs in July 2005 were carried over to the Cluster Approach. At that time, most of the

agencies and NGOs also had a presence and ongoing programmes within Somalia, in accordance with their diverse mandates. UNHCR, as one example, was already on ground dealing mainly with the protection of refugees, from refugee status determination in the context of mixed migration flows in Somaliland and more recently in Puntland, to durable solutions, including resettlement. UNHCR also had a returnee programme including reintegration activities, in both the afore-mentioned areas, although in Puntland and in areas of origin in South-Central Somalia in a limited capacity. Along with an established network of partnerships working on different aspects of the programme, UNHCR had a few on-going quick-impact projects being implemented to ensure sustainable returns.

25. UNDP, as another example, had, *inter alia*, an on-going rule of law and security programme, a good governance programme, a Somali Institutional Support programme, as well as other MDG-focused local initiatives - some of which touched on livelihoods. In terms of institutional and capacity-building, UNDP has also been involved in rehabilitating government buildings formerly occupied by IDPs (mainly from the 1991-2000 wave of displacement), in order to enable the TFG to effectively expedite its responsibilities. UNDP thus has many programmes in Somalia related to their mandate, with relevance to both early recovery and development. UNDP was a primary participant in the joint UN/World Bank needs assessment conducted in Somalia - the product of which was a Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia that also covers humanitarian issues, including assistance to IDPs<sup>3</sup>. This framework is intended to be the instrument for mobilizing, distributing and coordinating international recovery and development assistance.

26. UNICEF has also had a considerable and long-standing presence in most parts of Somalia in line with its mandate, and has extensive projects in different parts of country. Their main office in Somalia is in Bosasso. During consultations in the course of the mission, UNICEF informed the evaluation team that they had a staff of 250 persons dedicated to their Somali operation of whom 180, mostly locally recruited national staff, are field-based. They however did not have permanent staff in Galgayo which was a key host area for the new wave of displacement. Be that as it may, it was clear at the time of the evaluation, no other agency had made such an extensive investment.

27. HABITAT was primarily active in Bosasso, and is co-leading the Shelter Cluster with UNHCR, in addition to their normal capacity building work in assisting local authorities in governance and urban planning.

28. UNOCHA had a few field staff, and was considering further expansion at the time of the evaluation.

29. Overall, the evaluation team assessed that the implementation of the Cluster Approach in the locations visited in southern Puntland and South-Central Somalia was weak, especially in relation to leadership, inter-cluster coordination, and even in intra-cluster coordination. As noted in the key findings and recommendations, a lot of work remains to be done. It was clear that, because of the mixed causes of displacement, coupled with multiple displacements over long periods of time with

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<sup>3</sup> Please refer to <http://www.somali-jna.com> for details on the UN/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment as well as the final product, the Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia.

no solutions in sight, the definition of target beneficiaries was complex. The millions of other vulnerable Somalis further exacerbate the challenges of implementation.

### **Impact of the cluster approach**

30. With the exception of Bosasso, where the team was impressed by the momentum of Cluster Approach implementation, and its concrete impact on some of the beneficiaries, the lack of visible added value in Baidoa, Garowe and Galkayo was disturbing. This was particularly so in the settlements hosting newly-arrived IDPs from Mogadishu in the course of 2007. It was clear that the new displacement constitutes a humanitarian crisis within an on-going humanitarian emergency. The following are the summary highlights of findings/observations in the locations visited by the evaluation team.

#### *Baidoa*

31. In Baidoa, the team visited Hanana 2 which at the time of the mission was said to accommodate 930 families. Many of them had received NFI, including plastic sheeting and jerry cans from UNICEF (in collaboration with UNHCR), but there were no water, sanitation, or hygiene activities being implemented in the new sites where IDPs were located. The living conditions in those sites were far below the minimum acceptable, despite the new IDPs having arrived in some cases up to four months earlier. The team also visited the Kormara site which at the time accommodated 750 families. The situation there was similar to Hanana 2, save for the fact that even more households seemed not to have received any assistance, probably indicating more recent arrivals.

32. The third site visited in Baidoa was Bonkay which was a greater distance from the city. The beneficiaries said they had been attracted there by the nearby water-catchment area, given that many were said to be from a subsistence farming background. They also stated that they felt more secure there than in the urban centres, and that they lived peacefully with the host population. No assistance had been provided in this site, despite it having been in existence for the previous three months. The catchment area they were referring to is only useful during the rainy season, and their only source of water was from a nearby muddy water hole. Apparently there was a borehole that was servicing the surrounding villages, but it had broken down. They requested assistance for its repair. The same muddy water that they were using to wash their clothes and bathe in was also used for drinking and cooking.

33. In consultation with the TFG authorities in Baidoa, (Governor of Bay Region as well as the Minister of Women and Family Affairs), the evaluation team was advised that many more IDPs were being hosted by relatives and friends in the region - further straining the already distressed living conditions in the area. They stated that some of those IDPs would of their own volition be likely to move to existing sites, and this would ease the pressure on host families. In consultation with UN and NGO partners on the ground, the evaluation team was informed that UNICEF was looking into the issue of water, sanitation and hygiene in those camps as well, but also highlighted the fact that a lot more support had been given to the earlier sites especially those near parliament buildings in the city, and that restoring the main

water supply to the city was considered a higher priority than ensuring access to safe water in the new IDP sites.

34. In terms of coordination, agency representatives on the ground, including UNOCHA, informed the mission that some of the clusters were doing better than others, but highlighted the fact that coordination in Baidoa had only been initiated in May 2007 and was yet to take root. They informed the mission that the last NFI distribution had taken place during UNHCR's last Emergency Response Team period (several months earlier). UNHCR was represented by one temporary national staff member, recruited two months before, and was clearly still in the process of establishing some form of permanent presence in Baidoa, despite occasional support from international staff from Nairobi and national staff from UNHCR's Mogadishu office when safe access permitted. The very limited UNHCR presence in Baidoa is supervised by the geographically-distant UNHCR Mogadishu Sub-Office. The Branch Office informed the evaluation team that further support from BO Somalia was constrained by the limited travel budget, and the high cost of travel into Somalia generally.

#### *Garowe*

35. Garowe is the administrative capital of Puntland, and the evaluation team had the opportunity to discuss at length the humanitarian situation in Puntland with several stakeholders, including government officials, international and national non-governmental actors, and with representatives of UN agencies. In discussions with the Puntland Minister for Planning and Foreign Cooperation, consistent with the views expressed by other government officials in Puntland, the priority of the government was to stem the trafficking/smuggling of persons and illegal immigrants through Bosasso. They praised the support of UNHCR in terms of refugee status determination in the context of mixed migration flows in Bosasso, as well as the support of other international community actors in this regard.

36. The Minister also gave an overview of the humanitarian situation affecting the population at large, as well as the situation faced by the thousands of IDPs who have been hosted in Puntland for long periods without solutions in sight, and with little support. On the subject of development activity, the Minister referred to the five year development plan for Puntland developed with other UN and international community actors (assumed to be the UN/World Bank-led Reconstruction and Development Plan), and the Minister advised that the Government of Puntland would be establishing an aid coordination body within his ministry, but he noted that this was purely for developmental assistance coordination.

37. With regard to humanitarian relief and assistance to IDPs and vulnerable groups among the population, the Minister cited several challenges: that needs are astronomical because of the multiple displacements from drought to conflict, as well as the need to better address resettlement and reintegration of returnees coming back to their areas of origin within Puntland. He commented with concern that UN staff based in Puntland did not have decision-making authority and that all decisions are made in Nairobi. According to him, this contributed to delays in finalizing plans and delays in implementation. International agencies, the UN included, were implementing different activities in different locations with little government coordination, and in this regard he emphasized that the purpose and goal of

establishing the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA) under the Ministry of the Interior was to better coordinate all relief activities. A discussion ensued on the capacity of HADMA, which the evaluation team had already interviewed, and he agreed that there remained a need to strengthen HADMA's capacity, both in staffing, training and by empowering it.

38. In discussions with the IASC CT in Garowe, similar challenges were echoed. They cited problems of coordination because of the thin staffing on the ground, as a result of which it was difficult to have agency staff meet in any one place at the same time. The issue of high turn-over of staff was raised, as well as the challenges of short term deployments in the absence of permanent staffing with regard to the need for continuity and sustainability of interventions. Some IASC CT members commented that UNOCHA's limited presence was one cause of weak coordination, both between and within clusters, and that cross-cutting issues such as early recovery, HIV/AIDS, gender and especially environmental issues, were not being adequately addressed.

39. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) was a common concern raised by the beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluation team, both with regard to violations during flight, but also in the sites. In this respect, the team was advised that a pilot project had been developed by partners in Nairobi, in consultation with the field, but that it was still at the conceptual stage and yet to be implemented.

40. With regard to relief item distribution difficulties, most of those consulted by the evaluation team were of the view that given the vulnerability of such a large part of the resident population, relief distribution could only succeed if done within a more comprehensive, community-based, transparent and coordinated approach. This underscored the need for enhanced coordination mechanisms from the needs assessment stage through to implementation in southern Puntland. Most of the activities being implemented seemed to be beneficiary-driven, and driven by the mandate of a given agency, and it was felt that this dissipated rather than synergised the efforts and interventions by the diverse stakeholders. Plans for joint needs assessments were reported to have been formulated at the Nairobi level, but not yet implemented at the time of the evaluation. A proposal has also been made to upgrade UNHCR office in Garowe from Field to Sub-Office, which would help in raising the number of staff required with appropriate seniority.

41. That said, stakeholders interviewed by the team acknowledged that the Cluster Approach in Puntland had added value in terms of partnerships, for example as in agencies discussing IDP issues together in a common forum and working towards joint plans of action on agreed issues. However, they emphasized that its effectiveness needed strengthening through more resources, permanent staffing both local and international, training and most importantly the establishment of workable inter-agency implementation and coordination mechanisms. Key to this process, and highlighted by many stakeholders, was the need for an operational strategy, clearly defining roles and responsibilities.

#### *Galkayo*

42. The UNHCR Galkayo office covers a divided town. The north is administered by the Puntland Government, while the south is largely administered by clan leaders from South-Central Somalia. It is in UN Security Phase 4. UNHCR has an office in

the north Galkayo, and the only other partners there are UNDSS, with one staff member and UNICEF with one national staff member. UNHCR's plans include establishing an antennae office 60 kilometres south, security conditions permitting. ICRC and CARE International operate in the region south of Galkayo.

43. In north Galkayo, the team held consultations with the authorities, (Governor of Mudug Region, UNHCR staff, UNDSS staff and a big group of local NGOs). As mentioned earlier, Galkayo currently hosts some 55,000 IDPs, including the new wave of recent displacement in July 2007 from Mogadishu. Of this figure, 11,000 had arrived from South-Central Somalia between February and May 2007 fleeing heavy fighting between insurgents and the TFG; and in July another 2,600 IDPs arrived. With the ongoing insecurity in Mogadishu, there is a real likelihood that Galkayo will receive more IDPs because of its proximity to South-Central Somalia. This underscores the need to urgently build capacity in Galkayo, especially because the City (both north and south) is already overstretched in terms of absorption capacity, and because the living conditions are far below minimum standards. Generally, the evaluation team noted that the situation of the host community and other affected populations is little different to that being experienced by new IDP arrivals.

44. The evaluation team visited the Bulo Baley suburb of the town, which hosts many IDPs from the 2007 wave of displacement from Mogadishu. The team noted that there was a group of persons at the entrance to one site, who demanded to be consulted before the team could enter the camp. They claimed to be the spokespersons for the IDPs on that site, and are what is commonly referred to as "gatekeepers". The IDPs there have had to pay a monthly rent equivalent to US\$4.50 for the little plots they occupy, and it was reported in interviews that if they are unable to pay that rent, their children are taken hostage. They also complained that they had not been allowed by the landlords to erect any form of sanitation on the site, thus they were obliged to use the huge rubbish dump sprawling behind the site. Some women reported having been raped at the rubbish dump, and urged priority for assistance with both latrines and water.

45. At the time of the evaluation, no assistance had been given to this group - reportedly because serious security incidents had taken place during and following food and non-food distribution in nearby sites. This had led to an IASC CT decision to suspend relief item distribution in Puntland, Mogadishu, and South Central Somalia. In one incident, the team was advised that IDPs had been attacked following such a distribution, resulting in four men, all IDPs, being shot and killed. A few weeks before the visit of the evaluation team, a WFP warehouse had been looted following an attempted food distribution to IDPs. In both incidents, the perpetrators had not been identified but the team was informed by the authorities that the matter was under investigation. The conditions in which the new IDPs in this site were living were the worst of all the sites visited during the evaluation team's mission.

46. In south Galkayo, the evaluation team had discussions with the District Commissioner, Police Commissioner as well as clan elders. They presented a list of demands, including that UNHCR should open an office in South Galkayo and that more national staff should be hired from the south of the town. They also enquired about the progress of assistance they had previously requested for approximately 1,000 IDPs, many of whom had no clan affiliation in their region. *(NB: UNHCR Somalia has since distributed blankets, kitchen sets and jerry cans to 780 families from this*

*list, and specifically targeted a Bantu minority that was in an extremely vulnerable situation*). The activities of ICRC and CARE International were praised.

47. UNHCR's international staff along with others from international NGOs were relocated from Galkayo, (both North and South), on 5 August 2007 for security reasons.

*Bosasso*

48. The evaluation team had the opportunity to meet with most Cluster Approach actors based in Bosasso. During a useful group discussion with UN and international as well as local NGOs, it was clear that the staffing for and implementation of the Cluster Approach was more advanced than in central and southern Puntland, including coordination mechanisms. The team's visit to the pilot shelter project in Bosasso was the highlight of the many IDP site visits. The site was very well organized, and for once, the IDPs themselves seemed in control of the daily running of activities. There was an obvious sense of ownership amongst the beneficiaries. More details of the process leading to this success can be found under the Shelter Cluster as it is clearly a project that should be replicated in other accessible parts of Somalia.



## UNHCR-led clusters

### Protection

49. UNHCR and UNOCHA co-chair the Protection Cluster for Somalia, supported by excellent partners including the Norwegian and Danish Refugee Councils, along with many other partners at the local level with varying strengths and mandates. Field-based Protection Cluster Working Groups were amongst the earliest to get started in Bosasso, as well as in Hargeisa in Somaliland. Prior to the formal adoption of the cluster approach, there was already a protection working group in Bosasso. In collaboration with the UNHCR Branch Office for Somalia in Nairobi, several protection training workshops have been conducted.

50. The main activities of the field Protection Cluster that were being implemented at the time of the evaluation included the Protection Monitoring Network (PMN) and Population Movement Tracking (PMT). A weekly update is widely circulated to partners in Nairobi, as well as in Somalia. In many of the team's interviews and meetings with Cluster Approach partners, these weekly updates were greatly appreciated, as they provide useful current information and indicators on population movements, as well as protection/humanitarian concerns, that help to better inform planning and programmes. Information management within the Somali operation, however, did not appear to have been centralized, nor did the team discover any established system of inter-cluster reporting. The activities of the Protection Cluster will therefore hopefully provide a new impetus.

51. Another key activity is the IDP Profiling Project, which is being supported by the global Camp Management and Camp Coordination (CMCC) Cluster. The IDP Taskforce Pilot Initiative is based on the draft Guidelines for IDP Profiling developed by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) of the Norwegian Refugee Council. Implementation in the field is being led by the Danish Refugee Council. To date, they have covered Mogadishu, Galkayo, Bosasso, and Baidoa - using a random sampling method. UNHCR has been a key actor in handling the data collected, and has created a database at its Branch Office for Somalia in Nairobi. This database includes information on age, gender, diversity/clan dynamics, and other important information that can be used to increase in-depth sectoral analysis, assist in mapping needs, and help to plan appropriate interventions to provide better protection. The team welcomed the global CCCM initiative to hire a staff member who is currently supporting the Branch Office in managing and maintaining the database.

52. The challenges of the Protection Cluster are no different to those faced by the operation at large. Firstly, coordination seems to function well in Nairobi, to some extent in Bosasso, but is weak in the rest of Puntland and South-Central Somalia. The mission was also informed by Branch Office for Somalia that protection coordination was also functioning better in Hargeisa. That said however, intra-cluster coordination is an issue that the Protection Cluster Working Group in its 20 June 2007 meeting acknowledged the need to improve. The Cluster has identified a need to improve the prioritization of protection needs; to agree on roles and responsibilities - including a review of "who does what where"; and to establish an activity tracking mechanism.

53. The evaluation team advised that, given the repeated concerns expressed by beneficiaries regarding Sexual and Gender Based Violence, an SGBV sub-cluster under the Protection Cluster should be established, to ensure this issue receives more appropriate and systematic attention.

54. The team also noted that the “*droit de regard*” role of the Protection Cluster, in seeking to ensure other clusters take protection needs into consideration during their planning and implementation, is at present very weak due to both the absence of effective inter-cluster coordination mechanisms below the UN CT level and the absence of an operational strategy with clear roles and responsibilities, inclusive of priority areas for programme implementation.

55. With regard to sustainability of solutions and the interface between relief and recovery and, where the situation permits, early recovery and development activity, the team advises establishing a link between the activities of the UNDP Rule of Law and Security Programme and/or others dealing with livelihoods and capacity building generally. It is suggested that the formal activation of a stand-alone Early Recovery Cluster would go a long way towards bridging the existing coordination gap in this regard.

#### **Camp coordination and camp management (CCCM)**

56. The RC/HC and IASC CT decided not to activate the CCCM cluster for Somalia. The evaluation team felt that the reasoning behind this was unconvincing, given that most of the IDPs are living in camp-like situations, generally referred to in the Somalia context as “sites” or “settlements”, and that the living conditions in most of the sites visited by the evaluation team were far below minimum acceptable standards.

57. Despite the non-activation of a country level CCCM cluster, the global CCCM cluster has provided support in diverse ways to disseminate global camp management and camp coordination principles for the Somalia Operation. Most of this support has been through reinforcing the country level Protection Cluster activities and through support to information management. For example, in July/August 2006 at the request of UNHCR’s Branch Office for Somalia, the Field Information and Camp Coordination Support Section in UNHCR’s Division of Operational Services, (*hereinafter FICCS/DOS*) funded the mission of an Senior Protection Officer to Bosasso. The Officer's responsibilities were to, *inter alia*, reinforce the establishment of a Protection Cluster Working Group, assist in preparing a plan of action, initiate intra-cluster coordination mechanisms, lead the process of identifying immediate protection gaps, and develop mutually agreed terms of reference for the Protection Cluster.

58. FICCS/DOS has continued to reinforce the activities of the Protection Cluster in its Population Movement Tracking and through information management, by deploying a GIS/Operational Data Manager. This staff member manages the IDP Profiling Pilot Project database. Given the importance of these activities and the need for continuity, the team advises that this role should be mainstreamed into regular operations and possibly expanded to field locations, including training and information management resources.

59. The global CCCM Cluster also deployed an expert for the period March to August 2007 to support the UNHCR/HABITAT pilot project in Bosasso. Other support from the global CCCM Cluster includes training and dissemination of CD ROM on IDP key resources.

60. It is recommended that the IASC CT reconsider whether the formal activation of a CCCM Cluster in Somalia would add value in giving better focus in terms of site management, administration and coordination, all of which were identified as clear gaps in most sites visited by the mission.

## **Shelter**

61. UNHCR and HABITAT co-lead the Shelter Cluster. They have several partners, both local and international, with Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils being key actors. The innovative leadership arrangement is unique, and the evaluation team welcomed the active engagement of HABITAT in Somalia, as well as the objective of linking emergency shelter to longer-term shelter support. Co-ordinated shelter responses in Bosasso under the cluster system were clearly successful, and should be replicated elsewhere in Somalia. The value-added of this cluster was most evident in Bosasso, where several initiatives have been undertaken such as the pilot project funded by the UN Human Security Trust Fund which will be implemented shortly. UNHCR principally addresses emergency shelter needs, while HABITAT addresses longer term sustainable shelter needs in collaboration with the local authorities, bringing a more solutions-oriented urban planning and development perspective to the project. While several of those interviewed pointed out that extensive negotiations were required to make the project such a success, its positive impact on beneficiaries makes this investment worthwhile.

62. The negotiations were part of a long process of consensus-building prior to the start of the project. This included consultations with multiple stakeholders - including landlords and owners, training/workshops, and even human rights awareness raising through the local radio stations. It was significant, however, that the partners within the Cluster had negotiated and agreed upon a proper strategy with clear roles and responsibilities and everyone was therefore speaking with one voice in their different interactions with other stakeholders. This was important because it avoided the manipulation that so often happens when there is no clear strategy, and where the needs are as enormous as they are in Somalia.

63. With the exception of the above pilot, the team noted that there remain great needs for emergency shelter within Bosasso, other parts of Puntland, and in South-Central Somalia, as highlighted above in the reports from the different locations visited by the evaluation team. Towards this end, the Technical Support Section of DOS, (TSS/DOS) which is the seat of the Emergency Shelter Cluster within UNHCR, has rendered support to the Branch Office on various initiatives. For example, in August 2006, they supported the mission of the Senior Physical Planner to Branch Office Somalia, and jointly with HABITAT designed a temporary shelter unit that would be the model to cover emergency shelter needs in other parts of Somalia. TSS/DOS facilitated an Emergency Shelter workshop in Geneva in May 2007, which the shelter focal point in Somalia attended. Similarly in June 2007, the Senior

Technical Officer, (Emergency Shelter), fielded a support mission to Branch Office Somalia, to assist in establishing a non-food item tracking and monitoring system<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> See Mission Report of the TSS Senior Technical Officer dated 28 June 2007